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~~SECRET~~IAC-D-54/3
30 April 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Interagency Source Register

Attached is a communication from the Chairman, Interagency Priorities Committee (IPC), enclosing a revised draft "Interagency Source Register Procedures." This matter will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting for review and appropriate action with respect to the IPC's recommendation.

JOHN HEIRES
Secretary

(b)(6)

*Approved by IAC,
14 May 1957
(IAC-M-289, item 4)*

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Attachment to
IAC-D-54/3
18 April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee
ATTENTION: Mr. John Heires, Secretary, IAC
SUBJECT: Interagency Source Register

1. Pursuant to the direction of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) at its meeting of 15 January 1957, the Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (IPC) has reviewed a draft proposal for establishing an interagency source register (IAC-D-54/2, 4 January 1957) and approved the attached revised draft on 18 April 1957.

2. The IPC recommends that IAC consider and approve the "Interagency Source Register Procedures", as outlined in the attached draft.

(b)(6)


Thomas H. Karamessines
Chairman
Interagency Priorities Committee

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D R A F T~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~Attachment to
IAC-D-54/3
18 April 1957INTERAGENCY SOURCE REGISTER PROCEDURESPURPOSE

1. The purpose of the Interagency Source Register (ISR) is to provide a centralized file of clandestine sources in order to preclude multiple recruitment of sources and to facilitate the elimination of Paper Mills and Fabricators. ISR will not be considered a replacement for the already established uniform name checking arrangements.

PARTICIPATING AGENCIES

2. The IPC recommends the following as participating agencies, however, all IAC agencies may avail themselves of ISR facilities:

- a. Office of the Special Assistant for Intelligence,
Department of State
- b. Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of Army
- c. Directorate of Intelligence,
Department of Air Force
- d. Office of Naval Intelligence,
Department of Navy
- e. Central Intelligence Agency

RESPONSIBILITY

3. CIA* will be responsible for the staffing and maintenance of ISR. Source Register data submitted by the participating agencies will not be transmitted to the field or to other participating agencies through CIA channels without the prior approval of the agency concerned.

NOTE* Unless otherwise indicated, reference to CIA in this paper refers to the Deputy Director (Plans), Foreign Intelligence Staff, Records Integration Division.

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The Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (IPC) of the IAC shall assume the primary responsibility for overall supervision of ISR and is generally authorized to modify details of procedures outlined herein.

4. Participating agencies will provide ISR with the date of birth, place of birth, status (see Para. 9f) and the base country for sources in the following categories on a continual basis:

- a. Overseas clandestine sources of foreign intelligence information and their sub-sources.
- b. Alien sources who have resided in the United States less than two years prior to coming to the attention of the agency concerned.
- c. Foreign nationals whose disclosure of being affiliated with U.S. Intelligence could be detrimental to the policies of the United States as set forth in National Security Council directives.

5. In order to facilitate the establishment of ISR, each participating agency, as soon as possible, will submit the date of birth, place of birth, status and the base country on the categories of persons listed above on record in the respective agency as of the date these procedures are approved.

SOURCE DATA SUBMISSION

6. The Source Action Form (sample attached) or Machine Tabulating card will be completed for each submission to ISR as follows:

- a. Copies 1 and 2 will have all the data on the source and will be retained by the originating agency.

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- b. Copies 3, 4 and 5 containing the date of birth, place of birth, base country, file code number, status, and service requested will be forwarded to ISR. Copy 3 will be returned to the respective agency as indicated in Section 9b.

7. Each agency will use a prefix on the file code number registered with and approved by the Source Register Officer. This is the only manner in which Source Register can identify the agency primarily interested in a source.

8. A new Source Action Form or Machine Tabulating card, having the previously recorded file code number, will be submitted as indicated in Section 9f, when a source has been dismissed.

PROCESSING OF SOURCE REGISTER INFORMATION

9. Upon receipt of the information covered in Section 6 above, Source Register will:

- a. Check the submission against the Interagency Source Register.
- b. Inform the originating agency immediately by telephone if the check is negative. Copy 3 of the Source Action Form will then be stamped "Recorded", dated and returned to the originating agency. This will be that agency's source registration certificate.
- c. When the check is negative, copy 5 of the Source action Form or Machine Tabulating card will also be stamped "Recorded" and dated. This copy will then be placed in the Source Register.

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- d. When the check discloses that a source already registered has the same date and place of birth, Source Register will notify both agencies of the findings.
- e. It is the responsibility of the agencies concerned to resolve each conflict and advise Source Register in writing of the outcome, so that the proper corrections can be made in the Source Register.
- f. Participating agencies will also notify the Source Register when a source has been dropped and, whenever possible, the date and reason for discharge. The status code will be used as stated in paragraph 4 above (codes 1 and 2) and the remaining code numbers will be used to indicate the reason for discharge.

- (1) Active
- (2) Potential
- (3) Paper Mill and Fabricator
- (4) Security
- (5) Compromise
- (6) Ineptitude
- (7) Blackmarketing, smuggling, or other violation of law.
- (8) Without prejudice
- (9) Unknown
- (10) Deceased

10. The participating agencies will submit complete background data and a brief summary for discharging sources falling into categories 3 through 7 as indicated in 9f above.

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DETECTION AND CONTROL OF PAPER MILLS AND FABRICATORS

11. When a check indicates that a source has the same date and place of birth as a known or suspected Paper Mill or Fabricator, ISR, with the assistance of the agency in possession of relevant facts, will furnish all pertinent information to the agency which submitted the Source Action Form or Machine Tabulating card.

12. If, after reviewing this information, the requestor desires to utilize the services of the source in question, a new Source Action Form or Machine Tabulating card will then be submitted to indicate that the source is now active for the agency concerned.

13. When an agency has substantiated that a source is a Paper Mill or Fabricator, it will so advise ISR and furnish all pertinent data concerning the source as well as any information which tends to substantiate this suspicion.

14. When it has been determined that a source is a Paper Mill or Fabricator, a card with this notation will be placed in the ISR. If the danger exists that the source may continue to sell his spurious product, ISR will disseminate a report "burning" (denouncing) the source to United States Government agencies and to friendly foreign intelligence services, as a given case may require. ISR will coordinate the "burn" report with the other interagency members.

TO PROMOTE THE MOST EFFECTIVE USE OF SOURCES

15. Participating agencies will adopt their own internal procedures for eliminating unproductive sources, however, if a source produces information which is not of value to the agency controlling the source, but which is of value to another producing agency, mutual efforts will be made to effect the retention or transfer of the source.

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FORM NO. 1015
1 JUL 56

SOURCE ACTION

(2)

BIRTH DATE (Year-Month-Day)		BIRTH PLACE (Country-City)		FILE CODE
NAME (Last-First-Middle)		TELECODE	OPS COUNTRY	
ADDRESS (Country-State-City-Street-Number)				STATUS
IDENTIFYING CHARACTERISTICS (☐ Title ☐ Alias ☐ Nickname ☐ Name Variation)				
MARKS		OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA		
TYPE OF ACTION	DATE SUBMITTED	DATE REPLY	REPLY TYPE	
SERVICE REQUEST				
REGISTRATION				
DROPPED				
REMARKS				

ORIGINATOR'S
COPYFORM NO. 1015
1 JUL 56

SOURCE ACTION

(2)

BIRTH DATE (Year-Month-Day)		BIRTH PLACE (Country-City)		FILE CODE
		OPS COUNTRY		STATUS
TYPE OF ACTION	DATE SUBMITTED	DATE REPLY	REPLY TYPE	
SERVICE REQUEST				
REGISTRATION				
DROPPED				
REMARKS				

SOURCE CONTROL
COPY

NOTICE TO TYPIST
DETACH AFTER TYPING

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IAC-M-274
15 January 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting Held in
IAC Conference Room, Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency, at 1045, 15 January 1957

Director of Central Intelligence
Allen W. Dulles
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant for Intelligence,
Department of State
Major General Robert A. Schow, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Laurence H. Frost, Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
Major General Millard Lewis, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters,
United States Air Force
Brigadier General Richard Collins, Deputy Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff
Mr. Harry S. Traynor, Atomic Energy Commission representative
to the IAC
Mr. Alan H. Belmont, Federal Bureau of Investigation representative
to the IAC

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~~SECRET~~IAC-M-274
15 January 1957

1. Approval of Minutes
8 January Meeting
(IAC-M-273)

Approved as written.

2. Watch Committee Report
No. 336

a. Noted.

b. Mr. Dulles referred to his prior proposal regarding a review by the IAC as a body of crisis situations (IAC-M-273, 8 January 1957, item 5) and stated that he hoped to circulate a memorandum on this matter at an early date. In this connection, the Chairman and members noted, and exchanged views on, the situations in Poland (with particular reference to the probable impact of impending elections), Laos and Yemen.

3. Proposed Interagency Source
Control Procedures
(IAC-D-54/2, 4 January 1957)

a. After opening comments by the Chairman, Mr. Karamessines outlined and exchanged views with the members on the nature and purpose of this proposal. During the course of the discussion, Mr. Belmont, Mr. Traynor and General Collins indicated that their respective agencies would not expect actively to participate in this project. General Lewis raised some questions regarding the draft procedure as circulated (IAC-D-54/2), particularly with respect to the accuracy of its title and the extent to which an attempt should be made to specify the action to be taken by individual agencies after a check of the register disclosed possible duplication or derogatory information regarding sources.

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IAC-M-274
15 January 1957

b. The members agreed that the Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (IPC) should review this matter, bearing in mind especially the comments by General Lewis, and prepare a draft procedure to be submitted to the IAC for further consideration.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

5. SNIE 11-6-57
Soviet Gross Capabilities for
Attack on the Continental US
in Mid-1960

a. Approved as amended.

b. Noted the findings, and approved the action recommended in the post-mortem on this estimate.

6. Executive Session

At 1210 the Chairman requested an executive session. Following this discussion, the members at 1220 received a special briefing on another matter, which included reports by representatives of the Air Force and CIA, and by General Schow.

Adjournment: 1320

(b)(6)

JOHN HEIRES
Secretary

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IAC-M-274

15 January 1957

SECRETARY'S NOTES

1. The attention of the members is invited to their decision on 16 October that the IAC Standing Committee on Exchanges should submit an additional oral report within three months on further activities by the Committee (IAC-M-260, item 4 b). However, the Chairman of that Committee advises that, because of subsequent policy decisions affecting the exchange program, the Committee's activities have been substantially in abeyance during the intervening period. Under these circumstances, unless specifically requested to do so by a member, the Chairman does not propose to give such an oral briefing at this time. (b)(1)
(b)(3)

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IAC-D-54/2
4 January 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Interagency Source Control Procedures

1. On 24 July 1952 the IAC approved (IAC-M-77) the recommendations of an IAC ad hoc subcommittee established to determine methods for negating the activities of Paper Mills and Fabricators and for devising interagency source control procedures (IAC-D-54, 2 July 1952). However, terms of reference for the establishment and operation of an interagency source control mechanism subsequently proposed (IAC-D-54/1, 26 February 1953) did not receive the approval of the IAC agencies.

2. CIA believes that it would now be desirable for the IAC agencies to review this matter generally and attempt to devise more satisfactory procedures for dealing with this problem. CIA therefore recommends that the IAC refer the attached draft (Attachment A) to the Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (IPC), or an appropriate working group, for review and preparation of recommendations for submission to the IAC for final approval.

3. This matter will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting for appropriate action.

JOHN HEIRES
Secretary

(b)(6)

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Attachment to
IAC-D-54/2
4 January 1957
DRAFT

INTERAGENCY SOURCE CONTROL PROCEDURES

PURPOSE

1. The purpose of the Interagency Source Control Register will be to provide a centralized file in order to facilitate the elimination and a better control of Paper Mills and Fabricators, as well as to preclude multiple recruitment of sources.

PARTICIPATING AGENCIES

2. The active participating agencies of the Interagency Source Control Register, as indicated in IAC-D-54, will be:

- a. Office of the Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State.
- b. Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army.
- c. Directorate of Intelligence, Department of Air Force.
- d. Office of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy.
- e. Central Intelligence Agency.

RESPONSIBILITY

3. CIA* will be responsible for the maintenance of the Interagency Source Control Register. Source Control data

NOTE* Unless otherwise indicated, reference to CIA in this paper refers to the Deputy Director (Plans), Foreign Intelligence Staff, Records Integration Division.

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Attachment to
IAC-D-54/2
4 January 1957
DRAFT

submitted by the other participating agencies will not be transmitted to the field through CIA channels without the written approval of the agency concerned. The Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (IPC) of the IAC shall assume the primary responsibility for overall supervision of the Interagency Source Control Register and is generally authorized to modify details of the procedures outlined herein.

4. Participating agencies will provide the Interagency Source Control Register with the date of birth, place of birth and the operational base country for sources in the following categories on a continuous basis:

- a. Overseas clandestine sources of foreign intelligence information and their sub-sources.
- b. Alien sources who have resided in the United States less than two years prior to coming to the attention of the agency concerned.
- c. Foreign nationals whose disclosure of being affiliated with U.S. Intelligence could be detrimental to the policies of the United States as set forth in National Security Council directives.

5. In order to facilitate the establishment of the Interagency Source Control Register, each participating agency will

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Attachment to
IAC-D-54/2
4 January 1957
DRAFT

submit the date of birth, place of birth and the base country on the categories of persons listed above on record in the respective agency as of the date these procedures are approved.

SOURCE CONTROL DATA SUBMISSION

6. The Source Action Form (sample attached) will be completed for each submission to the Interagency Source Control Register as follows:

- a. Copies 1 and 2 will have all the data on the source and will be retained by the originating agency.
- b. Copies 3, 4 and 5 containing only the date of birth, place of birth, base country, file code numbers, and service requested, will be forwarded to the Interagency Source Control Register. Copy 3 will be returned to the respective agency as indicated in Section 9b.

7. Each agency will use a prefix on the file code number registered with and approved by the Source Control Officer. This is the only manner in which Source Control can identify the agency primarily interested in a source.

8. A new Source Action Form, having the previously recorded file code number, will be submitted as indicated in Section 9f, when a source has been dismissed.

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Attachment to
IAC-D-54/2
4 January 1957
DRAFT

PROCESSING OF SOURCE CONTROL INFORMATION

9. Upon receipt of the information covered in Section 6 above, Source Control will:

- a. Check the submission against the Inter-agency Source Control Register.
- b. Inform the originating agency immediately by telephone if the check is negative. Copy 3 of the Source Action Form will then be stamped "Recorded", dated and returned to the originating agency. This will be that agency's source registration certificate.
- c. When the check is negative, copy 5 of the Source Action Form will also be stamped "Recorded", and dated. This copy will then be placed in the Source Control Register.
- d. When the check discloses that a source already registered has the same date and place of birth, Source Control will notify both agencies of the findings.
- e. It is the responsibility of the agencies concerned to resolve each conflict and advise Source Control in writing of the outcome, so that the proper corrections can be made in the Source Control Register.

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Attachment to
IAC-D-54/2
4 January 1957
DRAFT

f. Participating agencies will also notify Source Control when a source has been dropped and, whenever possible, the reason for dismissal and date of discharge. The following code will be used to indicate the reason for discharge:

- (1) Paper Mill Activities
- (2) Fabrications
- (3) Security
- (4) Compromise
- (5) Ineptitude
- (6) Blackmarketing, smuggling, or other violation of law.
- (7) Without Prejudice (this pertains to individuals who voluntarily separated themselves, who are dropped because of shortage of funds, whose services are no longer required or can no longer be utilized, etc.).
- (8) Unknown
- (9) Deceased

10. The participating agencies will submit complete background data and a brief summary for discharging sources falling into categories 1 through 6 as indicated in paragraph 9f above.

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Attachment to
IAC-D-54/2
4 January 1957
DRAFT

DETECTION AND CONTROL OF PAPER MILLS AND FABRICATORS

11. When a check indicates that a source has the same date and place of birth as a known or suspected Paper Mill or Fabricator, CIA, with the assistance of any agency in possession of relevant facts, will furnish all pertinent information to the agency which submitted the Source Action Form. Further, CIA, after consultation with the agencies concerned, will submit a brief summary of this information to all other participating agencies.

12. Each agency will then take appropriate action to avoid further procurement of spurious information or unwitting future involvement with the source.

13. At any time a participating agency suspects a source of Paper Mill or Fabrication activities, it will so advise CIA and furnish all pertinent data concerning the source and any information which tends to substantiate this suspicion.

14. Upon such advise, or if a Source Control check results in suspicion, CIA, with the cooperation of the agency controlling or using the suspect source, will attempt to determine, by field investigation in appropriate cases, whether this suspicion can be substantiated or disapproved.

15. If, after discussions between CIA and the respective agency, it can be determined that the source is definitely

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Attachment to
IAC-D-54/2
4 January 1957
DRAFT

a suspect, Source Control will alert the other participating agencies.

16. When a source has been determined to be a Paper Mill, agent or fabricator through these or other procedures, files will be marked accordingly in the Interagency Source Control Register. If the danger exists that the source may continue to sell his spurious product, CIA will disseminate a report "burning" (denouncing) the source to United States Government Agencies and to friendly foreign intelligence services, as a given case may require. CIA will coordinate the "burn" report with the other interagency members. Interagency members will then take action within their agencies in accordance with paragraph 12 above.

TO PROMOTE THE MOST EFFECTIVE USE OF SOURCES

17. Participating agencies will adopt their own internal procedures for eliminating unproductive sources. However, if a source produces information which is not of value to the agency controlling the source, but which is of value to another producing agency, mutual efforts will be made to effect the retention or transfer of the source.

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FORM NO. 1015
1 JUL 56

SOURCE ACTION


(2)

BIRTH DATE (Year-Month-Day)		BIRTH PLACE (Country-City)		FILE CODE
NAME (Last-First-Middle)			TELECODE	OPS COUNTRY
ADDRESS (Country-State-City-Street-Number)				
IDENTIFYING CHARACTERISTICS (☐ Title ☐ Alias ☐ Nickname ☐ Name Variation)				
MARKS		OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA		
TYPE OF ACTION	DATE SUBMITTED	DATE REPLY	REPLY TYPE	
SERVICE REQUEST				
REGISTRATION				
DROPPED				
REMARKS.				

ORIGINATOR'S
COPYFORM NO. 1015
1 JUL 56

SOURCE ACTION

(2)

BIRTH DATE (Year-Month-Day)		BIRTH PLACE (Country-City)		FILE CODE
			OPS COUNTRY	
TYPE OF ACTION	DATE SUBMITTED	DATE REPLY	REPLY TYPE	
SERVICE REQUEST				
REGISTRATION				
DROPPED				
REMARKS				

SOURCE CONTROL
COPY

NOTICE TO TYPIST
DETACH AFTER TYPING

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 Security Informatio
 IAC-D-54/1
 26 February 1953

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

INTERAGENCY SOURCE CONTROL

1. Pursuant to the directive contained in IAC-D-54 dated 2 July 1952 and adopted by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 24 July 1952, a working group of IAC representatives has prepared and agreed to the "Terms of Reference" enclosed herewith for establishment and operation of an interagency source control mechanism.

2. These Terms of Reference are submitted for the approval of the members of the IAC and for their designation of a principal and alternate member to serve on the IAC source group. It would be appreciated if each agency would transmit in writing its concurrence and the designations to this Office by March 5.

James Q. Reber
 Secretary

23 May 1953

Upon inquiry by AF, I checked in status
 of this paper. DDP reports the paper itself
 is dead after the issue itself is very much alive.
 See also files of Mr. Reber's office (office of
 assistant to the director for Planning & Coord.) which indicate
 agency response at the kind. It was
 coordinated. Action was
 incomplete.

S-E-C-R-E-T
 IAC-D-54/1
 26 February 1953

MAR 2 1953
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Security Information

These Terms of Reference have been prepared and agreed to by the members of a working group of representatives of the participating agencies.

WORKING GROUP

[redacted]	Chairman	Central Intelligence Agency	(b)(3)
Mr. L. Douglas Heck		Department of State	(b)(6)
Mr. Roy Tod		Office of the AC of S, G-2,	
		U.S. Army	
Mr. Jack Alberti		Office of Naval Intelligence,	
		U.S. Navy	
Mr. George Garrett		Directorate of Intelligence,	
		U.S. Air Force	
Mr. S. J. Papich		Federal Bureau of Investi-	
		gation	

All meetings were attended also by [redacted] CIA, and [redacted] CIA, two of the four CIA personnel who actually operate the "Source Register."

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

Colonel Oscar W. Koch, CIA, attended most meetings as observer and advisor.

(b)(3)

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MEMORANDUM: To accompany IACSR and IACSG terms of reference
SUBJECT : Explanation of changes of terminology

1. In the terms of reference for operation of the interagency source control mechanism directed to be established by IAC-D-54, several terms are employed which for the reasons stated below do not appear in the IAC directive.

a. "Intelligence Advisory Committee Source Register"
(or "ISR")

This nomenclature is recommended to replace "Interagency Source Control Center" because

(1) "Intelligence Advisory Committee" is more definitive and authoritative than "Interagency."

(2) "Control" connotes and is used by the intelligence community to describe the recruitment, employment, direction, payment, and other operational management of sources. These functions are not assigned to the mechanism to be established by IAC-D-54.

(3) The word "Register" is not in current formal use by the intelligence community whereas "center", "Registry", etc., are. This change will prevent confusion with already named and operating establishments.

b. "Intelligence Advisory Committee Source Group"

This title is adopted to identify the personnel of the various agencies who are specifically designated and authorized to conduct source business.

c. "Drop Memorandum"

This term replaced "Burn Memorandum" since the word "burn" is used extensively in the intelligence community literally and specifically with regard to the destruction of documents and materiel.

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE SOURCE REGISTER

and

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE SOURCE GROUP

These terms of reference are adopted by the IAC member agencies as the basis for operation of a means of "interagency source control" and the discovery and elimination of "Paper Mills" and "Fabricators."

1. In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 102.(d)(3) of the National Security Act and of NSCID's 1., 5., and 11., the interagency mechanism for implementing and conducting the procedures directed by IAC-D-54 (Appendix 1), in order to assist in the detection and control of Paper Mills and Fabrication, to provide better evaluation of intelligence, and to promote the most effective use of intelligence sources, shall consist of an Intelligence Advisory Committee Source Register and an Intelligence Advisory Committee Source Group.

2. For the purpose of this directive, the following definitions are provided:

a. A clandestine overseas source is one whose identity cannot be revealed in the report which submits the information supplied by him.

b. Participating agencies are the Office of the Special Assistant for Intelligence of the Department of State, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of the Department of the Army, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Directorate of Intelligence, U.S. Air Force, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation subject to the exception noted in IAC-D-54.

3. The Intelligence Advisory Committee Source Register (hereinafter referred to as the "Intelligence Source Register" or "ISR") shall be the central repository for essential identifying data concerning all of the clandestine overseas sources of foreign positive intelligence information used by participating agencies, and shall be assembled and maintained within the Headquarters of CIA by CIA personnel initially not exceeding four in number.

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4. The Intelligence Advisory Committee Source Group (hereinafter referred to as the "Intelligence Source Group" or the "ISG") shall establish, within the provisions of IAC-D-54, policy and procedure for the conduct of the ISR and related activities, and shall be responsible for conduct of all activities relating to the ISR. The ISG shall consist of one principal and one alternate member appointed from each participating agency. These members shall be the only persons to whom ISR data will be disclosed.
5. The Chairman of the ISG shall be furnished initially from the membership representing the CIA, but shall then rotate among the members periodically.
6. Access to the physical location of the ISR shall be denied to all except the four persons designated in paragraph 3.
7. Data furnished by participating agencies for inclusion in the ISR shall be submitted on the agreed Data Form (Appendix 2) or equivalent, but only those portions so indicated in Appendix 2 need be completed for ISR purposes. These data, or any other pertinent information of sources, will not be disclosed to third parties without the consent of the submitting agency.
8. Upon receipt of the Data Form in the ISR, all pertinent CIA files will be searched and any source information resulting from this search, together with the information provided by the Data Form, will be filed in the ISR. Any pertinent information will be recorded on the blank space of the Form and the Form itself returned to the submitting agency. Similarly, if there is no unfavorable information and the source is not being used by another agency, the Form will be stamped "CLEAR" to so indicate.
9. If search of the ISR or pertinent CIA files discloses that a source is being used by more than one agency, or becomes "suspect" for whatever reason, the ISG members of the agencies concerned will meet for discussion of the case and determination of their courses of action.
10. Any intelligence source problem which cannot be resolved by the ISG members will be referred to the Chiefs of the Intelligence Agencies concerned.
11. When a source becomes "suspect" and investigation is indicated, this investigation will be conducted by the agency(ies) controlling the source. Other agencies, upon request, will cooperate and assist within their capabilities. The results of investigations and actions taken will be recorded in the ISR.

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12. The participating agencies may drop sources from time to time and for various reasons. When a field unit of an agency drops a source, its (Washington) headquarters shall be notified, and informed of the circumstances, in order that the ISR can record such action. However, if a field unit contemplates dropping a source without prejudice, other U.S. intelligence units in the local area shall first be provided with the opportunity of exploiting the source should they so desire. If a source produces information which is not of value to the (Washington) headquarters of the agency controlling him, but which is of value to another (Washington) participating agency, mutual efforts will be made by the ISG members, in coordination with appropriate field units, to effect his transfer or retention.

13. If a source is dropped because he has been determined to be a Paper Mill agent or a Fabricator of foreign positive intelligence, elimination of the source shall be effected by means of a "Drop Memorandum" (Appendix 3). These memoranda will be prepared by the controlling agency and disseminated by the ISR. Drop Memoranda will be classified and dissemination controlled as the originator desires; such desires to be submitted to the ISR with the Drop Memorandum. Drop Memoranda should also be accompanied by lists of all disseminated reports which were based on information supplied by the dropped sources. These lists should include the serial numbers of the reports, dates of publication, subject, and countries with which the reports deal.

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Appendix 1

IAC-M-77
24 July 1952

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Director's
Conference Room, Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency, on 24 July 1952

Director of Central Intelligence
General Walter Bedell Smith
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. Fisher Howe, acting for Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
Colonel G. B. Coverdale, acting for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army
Rear Admiral R. F. Stout, Acting Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Major General John A. Samford, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Air Force
Dr. Malcolm C. Henderson, acting for Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
Brigadier General Richard C. Partridge, Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Victor P. Keay, acting for Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Loftus E. Becker, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Raymond J. Sontag, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Robert Amory, Jr., Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Ralph Clark, Central Intelligence Agency
* Mr. Richard Helms, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Paul Borel, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Ludwell L. Montague, Central Intelligence Agency
Lieutenant General William H. H. Morris, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Richard Drain, Central Intelligence Agency

* For part of meeting

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* Colonel Oscar Koch, Central Intelligence Agency
* Mr. Walter Jessel, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Howard Furnas, Department of State
Colonel O. B. Sykes, Department of the Army
Mr. Roy S. Tod, Department of the Army
Captain Ray Malpass, USN, Department of the Navy
Mr. Lawrence Healey, Department of the Navy
Colonel Edward H. Porter, Department of the Air Force
Lieutenant Colonel T. J. Grant, Department of the Air Force
Mr. George D. Garrett, Jr., Department of the Air Force
Major John Allums, Department of the Air Force
Captain Charles M. Hebertson, USN, The Joint Staff

Allen Dines
Acting Secretary

Approval of Minutes

1. Action: The minutes of the last meeting, 2 July 1952, (IAC-M-76) were approved.

Progress Report (IAC-PR-25)

2. Action: It was agreed that the target date for NIE-70, "Conditions and Trends in Latin America Affecting U.S. Security," should be 15 October instead of 1 August.

Paper Mills, Fabrications and
Source Control (IAC-D-54)

3. Action: The recommendations of the paper were approved. It was understood that details as to the mechanics of other agency participation would be worked out with Colonel Koch.

4. Discussion: In response to General Samford's question it was explained that counter-espionage activities could make a contribution to the proposed program and that they could benefit greatly from it.

5. General Smith suggested that arrangements be worked out with State, FBI and the Military Services for their close participation or cooperation with the source control section in CIA through the designation of a single individual in each case.

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Probable Developments in
Venezuela (NIE-67)

6. Action: Approved with minor modifications.

Approaches by the Russians
to U.S. Representatives

7. Discussion: Mr. Becker called attention to several recent reports which might indicate a possible switch in Soviet policy regarding social contacts with U.S. and Allied personnel. It was agreed that the volume of these contacts was not necessarily unusual, but that the trend should be watched. Each agency will take whatever action it feels appropriate.


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2 July 1952

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

PAPER MILLS, FABRICATIONS AND SOURCE CONTROL



1. Subsequent to the IAC meeting of 27 March (IAC-M-66), an IAC ad hoc subcommittee met to determine methods for negating the activities of Paper Mills and Fabrications and for devising source control procedures. Attached is a paper, which has been agreed to by the membership of that committee.

2. It will be placed on an early IAC agenda for approval of the recommendations therein proposed.

ALIEN DINES
Acting Secretary

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2 July 1952

PROBLEM:

1. To establish an interagency intelligence source control mechanism.

GENERAL:

2. An IAC subcommittee meeting, held on 4 April 1952 to discuss the current CIA* procedures for detection of Paper Mills and Fabrication, resulted in a general agreement that the procedures outlined would be taken under advisement by each agency to determine their applicability within that agency.

3. At the 4 April meeting, a Working Group was designated to develop a practicable source control mechanism which would be submitted for the consideration of the IAC subcommittee. At its first meeting, the Working Group agreed that it would develop a mechanism which would not only assist in the detection and control of Paper Mills and Fabrication, but also result in better evaluation of intelligence and aid in the elimination of unproductive sources.

CONCLUSION:

4. To make this system operate effectively, the establishment of an interagency source control mechanism is essential.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

5. In consonance with the above, the Working Group recommends that:
 - a. Each agency establish, as rapidly as possible, its own source control procedures.
 - b. Information on foreign intelligence sources and intermediaries obtained by these procedures be held by the agencies controlling such sources, and the participating agencies furnish copies of this information to CIA.
 - c. As a service of common concern, CIA be the clearing house for interagency Paper Mill and Fabrication Control purposes.

NOTE: *Unless otherwise indicated, reference to CIA in this paper refers to the Interagency Source Control Section, Intelligence Audit Branch, Requirements Staff, Office of Special Operations, CIA.

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d. The procedures in TAB A be adopted by the participating agencies.

e. In order to make source control information readily usable by all concerned, the attached form (TAB B) be adopted, by those intelligence agencies whose source control facilities do not now provide this basic information to their respective headquarters.

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SOURCE CONTROL PROCEDURES

General

1. Participating agencies will furnish copies of information on their foreign intelligence sources to CIA.*
2. Upon receipt of these source descriptions, CIA will:
 - a. Assign a restricted file category number to these source descriptions and maintain them in an "Interagency Source Control Center."
 - b. Check each source description through the Central Registry of the Office of Special Operations.
 - c. Inform the participating agency concerned of the results of this check.

To Detect and Control Paper Mills and Fabrication

3. If check discloses source to be a known or suspected Paper Mill agent or Fabricator, CIA, with the assistance of any agency in possession of relevant facts, will furnish all pertinent information to the agency which submitted the source description. Further, CIA will submit a brief summary of this information to all other participating agencies.
4. Each agency will then take appropriate action to avoid further procurement of spurious information or unwitting future involvement with the source.
5. At any time a participating agency suspects a source of Paper Mill or Fabrication activities, it will so advise CIA and furnish all pertinent data concerning the source and any information which tends to substantiate this suspicion.
6. Upon such advice, or if a source control check results in suspicion, CIA/OSO, with the cooperation of the agency controlling or using the suspect source, will attempt to determine, by field investigation in appropriate cases, whether this suspicion can be substantiated or disproved.

NOTE: *In cases where sources are under the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, no source identity information will be submitted, since such sources are of concern solely to this agency.

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7. If after discussion between CIA and the suspecting agency, it is decided that the source is definitely suspect, CIA will alert the other participating agencies.

8. When a source has been identified as a paper mill agent or fabricator through these or other procedures, files will be marked accordingly in the "Interagency Source Control Center." If the danger exists that he may continue to sell his spurious product, CIA will disseminate a report "burning" (denouncing) the agent to United States Government Agencies and to friendly foreign intelligence services, as a given case may require. CIA will coordinate the "burn" report with other interagency members controlling or using the agent. Interagency members will then take action within their agencies in accordance with paragraph 4 above.

To Provide Better Evaluation of Intelligence

9. On request, participating agencies will furnish one another all relevant data on a source, and the source's access to information, when that information is in the following categories:

a. In cases of unusual importance where decisions of policy might be made on the basis of information reported by the source.

b. When the content of source's report on a critical subject or area is in distinct variance with information in the files of the agency requesting the complete source data.

10. Requests for complete source data will be held to a minimum. In those instances where a participating agency receives complete source data, it will retain the data under carefully controlled conditions, acceptable to the supplying agency, in order that it will be made available only to U. S. officials on a strict need-to-know basis.

To Promote the Most Effective Use of Sources

11. Participating agencies will adopt their own internal procedures for eliminating unproductive sources. However, if a source produces information which is not of value to the agency controlling him, but which is of value to another producing agency, mutual efforts will be made to effect his retention or transfer.

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Source No.

c/r

NAME IN FULL		ALIASES			
PRESENT ADDRESS					
DATE OF BIRTH		PLACE	PRESENT CITIZENSHIP	RACE	NATIONALITY
APPEARANCE	AGE	ACTUAL APPARENT	EYES	COLOR APPEARANCE	HAIR
	FACE	SHAPE			COLOR QUALITY
		COMPLEXION			HEIGHT
		BEARD			WEIGHT
		TEETH			BUILD
		MOLES/MARKS			POSTURE
		SCARS			BODY
	GENERAL APPEARANCE				MOVEMENT
	PROMINENT FEATURES				IMPEDIMENTS
	OTHER IDENTIFYING DETAILS				
EDUCATION	SCHOOL	LOCATION	COURSE	DEGREE	DATES
T, I, IEL	COUNTRY	DATES	PURPOSE	PERSONS AND/OR FIRMS VISITED	
MIL SERVICE	COUNTRY	ORGANIZATION	UNIT	RANK	DUTIES
DATE DISCHARGED				WHERE SERVED	DATES
PRESENT EMPLOYER		LOCATION	TITLE	DUTIES	YEARS

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

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2 July 1952

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c. As a service of common concern, CIA be the clearing house for interagency Paper Mill and Fabrication Control purposes.

d. The procedures in TAB A* be adopted by the participating agencies.

e. In order to make source control information readily usable by all concerned, the attached form (TAB B*) be adopted, by those intelligence agencies whose source control facilities do not now provide this basic information to their respective headquarters.

/* NOTE (added):

(1) TAB A is following sheet

(2) TAB B is Appendix 2 to Terms of Reference. 7

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Source No.

c/r

NAME IN FULL		ALIASES					
PRESENT ADDRESS							
DATE OF BIRTH		PLACE	PRESENT CITIZENSHIP	RACE	NATIONALITY	SEX	
APPEARANCE	AGE	ACTUAL	EYES	COLOR	HAIR	COLOR	
		APPARENT		APPEARANCE		QUALITY	
	FACE	SHAPE	BODY	HEIGHT			
		COMPLEXION		WEIGHT			
		BEARD		BUILD			
		TEETH		POSTURE			
		MOLES/MARKS		MOVEMENT			
		SCARS		IMPEDIMENTS			
	GENERAL APPEARANCE						
	PROMINENT FEATURES						
OTHER IDENTIFYING DETAILS							
EDUCATION	SCHOOL	LOCATION	COURSE	DEGREE	DATES		
TRAVEL	COUNTRY	DATES	PURPOSE	PERSONS AND/OR FIRMS VISITED			
MIL SERVICE	COUNTRY	ORGANIZATION	UNIT	RANK	DUTIES	WHERE SERVED	DATES
EMPLOYMENT	DATE DISCHARGED						
	PRESENT EMPLOYER	LOCATION	TITLE	DUTIES	YEARS		
	PAST						
MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS		PRESENT					
prof., soc., pol.		PAST					
CONTACT	HOW, WHEN, WHERE FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED						
MOTIVATION	BEST ESTIMATE OF SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION						
SOURCES	HOW AND FROM WHOM DOES HE OBTAIN INFORMATION						
REMUNERATION	HAS SUBJECT BEEN PAID FOR INFORMATION? IS PAYMENT PROPOSED? WHAT AMT. PER REPORT, WEEK, MONTH, ETC.						
EVALUATION	SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY, SECURITY						
Attach recent, dated photograph			ATTACH SAMPLE OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING IN ALL LANGUAGES KNOWN TO SUBJECT				
			ATTACH FINGERPRINTS				

Appendix 2

CONFIDENTIAL (RUC) MEMORANDUM

Declassified

SUBJECT: Joseph G. DOKESH, aka Joseph G. Decker, alias pseudonyms: Tweddie, alias Josef Schmidt

1. Subject is selling fabricated (spurious) intelligence reports to (various - 25) intelligence agencies in Mexicana.

2. Subject was born 32 February 1933 at Philadelphia, Mexicana. He is a ditch-digger by trade and a Roman Catholic whose last known address in January 1952 was 4 Philip St., Philadelphia. Subject is single but is engaged to Lucille Bullovski, also a resident of Philadelphia and daughter of John Bullovski, prominent CP official. Subject, a former Peasat, is a CP member. His physical description follows:

Height	:	190 cm
Weight	:	400 lbs
Eyes	:	orange
Hair	:	blue
Build	:	slight
Other characteristics:		square face, pallid complexion, broken nose in three places, left arm amputated above the elbow, walks with decided limp, tattooed anchor on right palm.

3. The subject matter of DOKESH's reports usually deals with Communist Party activities and official directives and political information concerned with the Mexicanian government wherein he claims numerous sub-agents controlled by him through his activities in the MCP. Among subject's intelligence contacts is Josef BLOKOVSKI, alias Tweddie DUK, alias Tweddie DEE, well known intelligence fabricator active in Mexicana. *

* (NOTE: If any of the above points are not available, it should be so stated in the body of the blind drop (turn) memorandum.)

Declassified

Appendix 3